Strategy Research Project

DOD TAKE A KNEE. LET THE NGOS CONTINUE TO LEAD

## BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

DOD TAKE A KNEE. LET THE NGOS CONTINUE TO LEAD

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ABSTRACT

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Failing social systems and failing governments in the third world leave the U.S. government searching for ways to leverage the capabilities and expertise of non-governmental organizations to help reverse these trends. Small steps towards a solution appear to be underway, but they fall short of the need to build long-term trusting relationships, foster transparent activities, and achieve the complementary results necessary to garner the enduring support of the non-governmental organizations. This essay examines three strategic alternatives to synergize efforts between U.S. government agencies and the non-governmental organizations conducting worldwide developmental assistance activities. Each alternative represents a viable solution with appealing aspects to be leveraged and concerning aspects to be mitigated. The three alternatives are weighed against the combined concepts of organizational identity and levels of trust theory to determine which best fosters enduring relationships, transparency, and yields the greater potential for strategic success. A best strategic alternative is recommended.

DOD TAKE A KNEE. LET THE NGOS CONTINUE TO LEAD

In the 21st century the greatest challenge to the United States inspired world order may be the failing social systems and the failing governments of the third world. It poses challenges and costs for which the U.S. government remains ill prepared to address alone. Numerous references list the need for the United States government (USG) to leverage the capabilities and expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Capstone documents like the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006 specifically address this need. Examples include, "Unleashing the Power of the Private Sector"[1] and "Forming creative partnerships with nongovernmental organizations…to support and reinforce their work."[2] Small steps appear to be underway to create a venue for communicating between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the NGOs. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan suggested, "the idea is to develop some kind of 'neutral space' where officials from divergent worlds can debate how to promote security and offer help in Africa."[3] While noteworthy, the idea of creating a "neutral space" limits and falls short of the National Security Strategy objectives stated above.[4] The ideal solution must build long-term trusting relationships, foster transparent activities, and achieve complementary results in order to optimize developmental assistance initiatives in the third world. This essay examines three viable alternatives, and then makes a single recommendation for improving coordination between the U.S. government agencies and the non-governmental organizations.

<u>Contextual View</u>

Intentionally provocative, the title of this essay suggests the need for the DoD to pause and perhaps let the enduring expertise of the NGO community continue to prevail in the expanding realm of developmental assistance in the third world. For decades, the NGOs prided themselves on their ability to achieve success on a shoestring budget with little or no U.S. government interest or assistance. Key elements of any successful solution must build trust by enabling the actors to communicate, encouraging a willingness to cooperate, creating the vision to collaborate, and promoting the opportunistic mindset to enhance or complement another teammate's capabilities. Trusting, mature relationships create transparency and optimize positive effects in support of the under privileged populations of the world.

Contextually the issue of developmental assistance coordination focuses on the question, "How can members of a first world society produce greater developmental assistance effects in the third world?" Any ideal solution must optimize the relationships and capabilities of all three developmental assistance actors: the Department of Defense; the Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and the confederacy of non-governmental organizations. An optimal solution creates enduring strategic effects greater than a bureaucratic conference center labeled "neutral space" for divergent parties to meet to hammer out problems. Such a solution must transgress current paradigms and reach down through the strategic-level to the lowest, most personal-level needed to reverse the failing social systems of the third world. The first world now realizes the importance of developmental assistance and dedicates exponentially increasing financial resources towards this demanding problem.[5] In fact, responsiveness by private donors can be

measured in the billions, not just millions, of dollars annually. The next strategic step requires the three developmental assistance actors to find more effective ways of working together to respond to the needs of the third world. This essay suggests three strategic alternatives to better enable the three primary actors to optimize developmental assistance initiatives and reverse the failing social system trends in the third world. In the final analysis a single alternative will be recommended for implementation as the optimum solution.

<u>Methodology</u>

Clearly any solution must foster long-term, positive relationships between each of the actors to promote the best possible developmental assistance effects in the third world. Preceding the discussion of the three alternatives will be an overview of the roles of each actor in the realm of developmental assistance activities. Next, an introduction to the concept of organizational identity and levels of trust theory will be offered as a method of predicting the likelihood of each organizational structure to foster the desired level of trust needed to optimize developmental assistance initiatives. Next, the three alternatives will be sequentially introduced. All three represent viable options and enable improved relationships compared to the current tangential awareness of the other actors' activities. Finally, the three alternatives will be compared to determine an optimal solution for future implementation to fully enable the three primary actors.

Within the U.S. government, the Department of Defense supports the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development's mission by providing small elements of trained teams focused on developing local humanitarian assistance projects and disseminating critical information in support of U.S. foreign interests. Specifically,

Civil Affairs teams deploy to third world nations at the request of the U.S. Ambassador to perform humanitarian assistance activities such as constructing health clinics, digging fresh water wells, and building schools.[6] The complementary Military Information Support Teams also deploy to support the U.S. Ambassador's Public Diplomacy mission by creating and disseminating leaflets, education materials, radio programs, and television programs. Example message themes include mine and unexploded ordnance awareness, good governance, and HIV/AIDs awareness.[7] Together these military teams offer a U.S. Ambassador in a third world nation a significant capability to demonstrate goodwill, improve local conditions, and promote U.S. values.

The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development work together to further U.S. values and policies. In fact, the combined DoS/USAID mission statement reads as follows: "Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system."[8] The differentiation between the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development lies in their specific responsibilities. The Department of State supports the U.S. Ambassador as the President's primary representative to the recognized government of a specific nation to further U.S. foreign policy interests.[9] The U.S. Agency for International Development, an independent agency, complements the Department of State's foreign policy focus by implementing foreign assistance initiatives directed by the Secretary of State.[10] Specifically, U.S. foreign assistance initiatives serve the "twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign

policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world."[11] U.S. foreign assistance falls into the following categories: "economic growth; agriculture and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance."[12] These capabilities, when properly implemented, can significantly improve free market economies, good governance, and enhance the livelihood of citizens of the third world.

The civil society community, defined by the umbrella term non-governmental organizations, represents a confederation of private volunteer organizations (PVOs), faith-based organizations, cooperatives, foundations, corporations, the higher education community, and individuals dedicated to improving the quality of life of the third world populace.[13] NGOs, often supported by the contributions of a generous value-based U.S. society, garner significant resources for the sole purpose of helping these less fortunate peoples. For example, the USG tripled its annual developmental aid programs for Africa from $10 billion to $27.5 billion from 2001 to 2005.[14] Although significant, it reflects only fifteen percent of the total annual U.S. aid focused on Africa. Privately donated resources, via U.S. non-governmental organizations, yielded the majority of the remaining eighty-five percent.[15] In real numbers for 2007, the Center for Global Prosperity estimates private assistance from U.S. donors provided a powerful $95 billion dollars.[16] In 2005, U.S. private donors gave at a rate fourteen times greater than the next highest country in the world.[17]

Significant growth in the total number of NGOs and the resources enabling their activities reflects a keen understanding of the third world's problems by Americans and other nationalities. Categorically, civil society's interests fall into several key areas.

First, adherence to fundamental values aimed at alleviating human suffering.[18] Second, a general understanding of the need to reverse growing anarchy, the rapid spread of disease, and an increased affinity for conflict.[19] Finally, the pragmatic threat to the global economy posed by failing social systems and failing governments. They understand the globalized economy functions best when peace, prosperity, and global access to resources and trade can exist via the free market system.[20]

Determining an optimal organizational solution depends on the ability of the recommended solution to foster trusting relationships equally among each member. Fortunately, current research on the topics of organizational identity, essentially "team spirit", and levels of trust theory supports this need.[21] According to this research, "Trust at the level of organizations refers to a collective commitment and cooperation in order to achieve organizational goals."[22] "Identification-based trust develops when [all parties] know and predict the other's needs, preferences and choices and also shares some of those same needs, preferences and choices as one's own."[23]

The concept of identification-based trust can be successfully applied to any proposed alternative to predict the optimal solution based upon its ability to reach the highest of four levels of trust. Communications, the first or foundation level of trust, must be developed in order to create an organizational structure. Concepts indicating success at this level include developing common "terms of reference", as well as venues for freely and effectively expressing ideas and concerns. Progression to level two, cooperation, indicates a willingness to freely exchange critical planning information and compromise individual organizational priorities to achieve success for the entire team. Willingness to "do" something at this level of trust indicates a commitment on the

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part of the participating actors not required by the first level of trust. As further defined

by current research, "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another

party, based on the expectation, that the other will perform a particular action important

to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party"[24]

represents a key aspect of building trust. Progression to the third level of trust,

collaboration, indicates a willingness to merge the resources of multiple members of the

team to achieve the agreed upon, synergistic effects. Agreeing to "pool resources"

represents the primary difference between collaboration and cooperation. At this level

each team member still retains the ability to operate independently, if necessary.

Progression to the final level of trust, complementary capability, defines the desired

level for the optimal organizational structure. The ability to conduct interdependent

activities requiring the assistance of another actor(s) indicates successful achievement

of this level. Optimally, newly freed up organizational resources could be directed to

other un-resourced developmental assistance requirements to achieve a greater overall

effect in the third world. Few organizations achieve this level of trust. The perceived

level of risk, in terms of human or material resources, associated with trusting the

capabilities and intentions of the other organization is too great to justify the potential

reward to both organizations even if a high payoff can be anticipated.

An example of complementary capability is demonstrated in the following scenario.

Two separate NGO teams are co-located in a remote region. Each NGO team

possesses different resource strengths and weaknesses. They can potentially

overcome their weaknesses and maximize their strengths by merging their resources

more effectively. In this scenario, one NGO team assumes responsibility for providing

the necessary food, water, and trucks for movement and distribution at a specific location. A second NGO team agrees to provide the aid workers to distribute the food and water. In this case, the second NGO team assumes risk and trusts the first team to provide the commodities and dispatch all of the necessary and mechanically sound trucks to safely and effectively transport the aid workers and supplies to the dispersal point. If the first team does not show, then the second team has "wasted" their workers' time and failed to provide aid to the needy third world populous. Hence, if they have trucks and the goods, most NGOs forego any risks. However, if they had justified trust, it would allow the second team to collaborate with the first team freeing any trucks the second team had for additional missions. Thus, the two teams could do more and earn more credibility together than alone.

Since limitless human and material resources do not exist; achieving a complementary capability level of trust optimizes the combined efforts of both NGO teams. The food, water, and trucks of the first do not sit idle and can be used to leverage the existing capabilities of the second NGO. In effect, both NGOs can accomplish more together through complementary actions than independently as they learn to trust each other to meet their common commitments.

NGO's have created conglomerates to deal more effectively with major crisis and developmental assistance efforts. An argument could be made for an existing NGO conglomerate to assume the task of coordinating with the DoD. Examples of world class candidate organizations include Global Impact,[25] and InterAction.[26] Multiple concerns argue against the viability of this option. First, as DASD Whelan articulates, "The NGOs are going to do NGO things. We are going to exist in the same

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space…NGOs have their own mission and are very protective of that we…aren't [going to] threaten that in any way, shape or form."[27] Second, any solution that significantly burdens the NGOs financially or requires additional personnel solely to interface with the DoD will not work. For good cause, the NGOs continue to pride themselves on their ability to sustain razor thin administrative margins in order to focus their constituent's donations on their intended developmental assistance initiatives. Constituents vote with their donations and stop donating when perceived overhead is too high. However, the NGOs existing expertise can help establish and implement any of the alternatives considered viable.

Alternative Solution #1: A DoD-hosted Communications and Coordination Quorum

A Department of Defense-hosted communications and coordination quorum represents the first of three conceptual solutions. The DoD-hosted quorum parallels the concept of a current Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), but at the strategic level.[28] This concept includes establishing a coordination capability focused on the developmental assistance mission with representation from various military units, other U.S. government organizations, and the voluntary participation of NGOs. Essentially, the CMOC monitors resources and receives assistance requests from anyone detecting a specific developmental or humanitarian need, processes the request, and directs or recommends additional resources, as available, to support the need.[29] In contrast to the single mission focus of a CMOC, the DoD-hosted quorum establishes a permanent "coordination" structure focused on developing an enduring relationship among DoD participants, DoS/USAID representatives, and participating NGOs. Properly implemented, the developmental assistance efforts of the quorum can resolve the crisis,

dissuade the formation of a local insurgent group, and further legitimize the friendly government under the umbrella of U.S. assistance.[30] While most NGOs traditionally refrain from performing developmental assistance activities based purely upon political aspirations or national security concerns, their rapidly expanding activities and resources almost ensures overlapping efforts in the same geographical village, region, or country as the DoD's programs. Coexistence appears inevitable. Thus, encouraging NGO membership in the quorum logically helps all members leverage regional knowledge, precludes duplication of effort, and hedges against DoD "missteps" in supporting U.S. interests.

The DoD-hosted quorum possesses several appealing aspects. First, the ability for all member organizations to leverage the Defense Department's capabilities to provide and transport resources is attractive. Second, from a human resources perspective, innocuous Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) can augment efforts to relieve suffering by providing infrastructure improvements and promoting educational opportunities for the residents of the partner-nation. Not necessarily tied to a DoD-hosted coordination effort, these trained teams can act independently with the State Department's approval or partner with an NGO. In addition, the DoD can provide planning and operational capabilities to develop areas of responsibility, coordination boundaries, provide personnel tracking systems to mitigate safety risks to travelers, and plan and coordinate multi-agency efforts.

Two major concerns argue against a DoD-hosted quorum: consistency and operational security. National security priorities and the availability of DoD human and material resources inhibit predictable employment of DoD capabilities. Under the

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current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) strategy, preventing the spread of terrorism and violent extremism represents an unequivocal priority in the third world.[31][32] Thus, all readily available resources of the DoD are directed toward conducting humanitarian assistance activities aimed at achieving the strategic goal of deterring the growth of terrorism and violent extremism throughout poverty stricken regions of the third world.[33] Consequently, in the short-term, DoD human resources (CA & MIST personnel) remain in high demand worldwide and are redeployed based on GWOT priorities preventing the likelihood of consistent, full-time presence of these teams in a non-threat region. In addition, over the long-term, changing national priorities may remove or further reduce critical human and material resources needed to sustain a DoD-hosted quorum or the associated developmental assistance activities planned for any particular region. This unreliability validates the NGOs' historical distrust of the DoD and an enduring solution to this fundamental policy issue cannot be remedied by well-intentioned DoD personnel at the planning level.

A second concern focuses on the DoD's inability or failure to share basic planning information with the NGOs. It represents both a procedural issue and cultural insensitivity on the part of the DoD. From a procedural perspective, the DoD attempts to mitigate risk to its personnel by limiting the distribution of travel and operational information to prevent a terrorist or criminal attack on its teams. Its nature is to be closed as opposed to open. Culturally, if a DoD activity agrees to host an activity, their view of their role as a "host" is construed as a directive role in most cases. A true "host", on the other hand, recognizes the importance of maintaining a complementary role to assist fellow teammates. The DoD "Director" is more apt to selectively provide

information to the collective "group" while s/he simultaneously demands full disclosure from the NGOs. In effect, the DoD director treats the NGOs like a "supporting" subordinate component, contractually bound to respond to the DoD. Thus, the DoD "host" may or may not be completely forthcoming with the information needed to conduct cooperative, collaborative or even complementary planning, and may be counterproductive culturally.

The ability to predict "levels of trust" definitely applies to a DoD-hosted quorum. The first level of trust, communications, represents a DoD strength at least from a "capabilities" perspective. The DoD can certainly move electrons in support of the greater cause for all concerned. The "ability" to communicate represents a distinct limitation. The need to develop "terms of reference" points to the DoD's weakness and lack of experience communicating outside of its normal circles of interest. Recruiting and enabling dedicated personnel, highly experienced in CMOC-like operations, could mitigate this perceived shortfall and enable progression to the next organizational maturity level, cooperation, but this is unlikely in the short-term.

Techniques for "cooperating" include sharing planning databases and encouraging logical divisions of labor. Again, positive experiences and applied lessons-learned from previous civil-military coordination experiences can be integrated into the DoD-hosted quorum. The first test of the quorum's ability to foster cooperative solutions may require the members to compromise over "who" performs "what" task at a specific location or event. The strength or weakness of personal relationships, trust, and emotional attachment to a region or specific project may complicate the agreement. If issues

become too contentious, the DoD-hosted quorum may never mature past the initial stages of the cooperative level of trust.

The willingness of the participating team members to pool resources both geographically (working together in the same village or areas) and functionally (sharing the same resources) signals progression to the collaborative trust level. Here some of the environmental limiting factors like organizational norms, rules, and laws may prevent the achievement of optimal collaborative goals in spite of the best efforts of motivated quorum members at the local level. Projects for initial success may be limited to simple cooperation like sharing a consolidated supply point until the overarching limiting factor can be overcome. Thus, the prospect of attaining the fourth level of organizational maturity, complementary capability, appears unlikely within the first several years of implementation.

Finally, regression from a higher back to a lower trust level represents a likely and recurring issue for the DoD-hosted quorum. As the DoD attempts to rotate key personnel to meet worldwide demands, the new team formed within the DoD-hosted quorum temporarily regresses to a lower level of trust. This represents a natural reaction by the representatives of the remaining actors until the new team members prove themselves trustworthy and reliable. Until the DoD overcomes its personnel turbulence in critical CA and MIST units, consistent working relationships will be difficult to foster. Thus, the prospects for sustaining a collaborative level of trust are systematically improbable. In summary, a DoD-hosted quorum can achieve reasonable levels of organizational trust over time, but the results will vary from the lower end of the "cooperation" level to the mid-level of the "collaborative" level depending on the level of

trust achieved, personal relationships, emotional attachment to a region or specific project, and regression to a lower level of trust.

Alternative Solution #2: A DoS/USAID-hosted Coordination Cell

In contrast to the DoD-hosted quorum, the second alternative, the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell already enjoys a well established reputation with many of the most prominent NGOs since it is already practiced in some embassies. Also, in contrast to DoD practices, the DoS/USAID community traditionally depends on NGOs and other organizations to conduct the activities funded through various pools of U.S. government-sponsored developmental funding. In practice, the NGOs receive funding from both their parent organizations and supplemental funds or resources from DoS/USAID to conduct various humanitarian relief and educational programs. This represents a long standing, well rehearsed practice between the two sets of developmental assistance actors that could be formalized and enhanced.

Designing an organization enabling better coordination among the DoS/USAID, the NGOs, and DoD as a newcomer to the developmental assistance effort could prove challenging. Due to their relatively small staff in comparison to the DoD, the current DoS/USAID coordination process focuses on "enabling" the NGOs to perform the actual developmental assistance activities by garnering federal grants and developmental assistance funding. Under current practice, the DoS/USAID collective develops and monitors U.S. funded activities much like the USG monitors contracts for government services performed by commercial vendors. In stark contrast, the DoD approach deploys DoD-trained elements into the field to actually perform many of the same functions as the NGOs. Potentially, such capability complements or conflicts with the

NGO's efforts on the ground. Any likelihood of conflict reinforces the need to develop a robust coordination cell to optimize the contributions of all concerned.

The DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell creates several appealing opportunities to further leverage and resource existing developmental assistance practices. First, recognizing the need to establish a formal DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell now, before it becomes necessary to react to a serious incident later, could be a great advantage. Even though the U.S. Ambassador retains responsibility for all USG activities inside of their assigned third world country, very little formal coordination with other embassy employees occurs within some embassies. Direct coordination normally occurs only between an overworked embassy staff member and a specific NGO. Likewise, a visiting DoD representative only talks to the DoD representative in the embassy. Unfortunately, the under-resourced and overworked embassy staff seldom finds the time to share routine coordination information laterally among all staff members. Such a practice inadvertently precludes coordination and the cross-pollination of knowledge. A coordination cell would alleviate these problems.

Here, two words, "habitual relationships," summarize the real appeal of a DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell. The habitual relationship factor promises superior "in country" continuity for both the USG and the NGO community. The ability to produce consistent, high quality developmental assistance programs year after year is very attractive. Thus, the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell appears to be a logical choice as long as the DoD capabilities and interests can be incorporated into the coordination cell.

Unfortunately, the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell poses additional concerns. First, the DoS/USAID coordination cell represents the "de facto" system in-place today. Even if additional embassy personnel and federal funds could be focused on increased coordination venues, no real change in the methods of coordination are likely—the NGOs are happy with the current coordination and supervision processes. This aspect represents a serious concern for the DoD, who enters the picture as a third, possibly unwanted party with its own organizational culture and practices. Based on the strong, habitual relationships between DoS/USAID and the NGOs, the ability of the DoD to enter into a partner-like relationship with the other actors is highly questionable—at the least it appears challenging.

A second concern, reliance on the U.S. federal budget system, remains a common concern for both the DoD and the DoS. The annual federal budget system represents a twofold problem, one more pronounced historically for DoS/USAID than the DoD. Part of the problem can be described as "winning" Congressional approval for funds. Historically, Congress prefers to approve funds for federal programs directly supporting their individual constituencies. DoS/USAID programs, focused on the third world, do not provide a direct benefit to a Congressional constituency. The inconsistent "flow" of federal funds defines the second part of this problem. When Congress fails to approve the annual budget in a timely manner, Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA)[34] prevents the U.S. government from shutting down at the end of the current fiscal year. Unfortunately, CRA typically limits federal funding to "essential activities only" until the annual federal budget becomes law. In most cases, developmental assistance initiatives and associated non-essential funding cannot be committed without an

approved budget. If Congress approves the funds very late in the current fiscal year, federal agencies cannot execute the budget as designed. Thus, consistent funding of "non-essential" project like the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell represents a serious concern for all actors.

Assuming the ever challenging budget issues can be overcome, applying the "levels of trust" theory to the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell presents a unique set of challenges. First, the DoS/USAID team and many of the NGOs over the years developed enduring relationships reflecting high levels of organizational trust. In fact, most fall into the category of cooperative or collaborative levels of trust. Two key sub-points enabled this level of trust to develop. The first sub-point, resulting from the very limited program funding over a number of years, encouraged more trusting relationships among the DoS/USAID decision-makers and the NGOs leadership in order to create opportunities for developmental assistance in a resource limited environment. The second sub-point, program survival in the field during the lean funding years encouraged the development of long-term, bi-lateral personal relationships between many very dedicated individuals. These dedicated professionals placed their concern for the success of the program ahead of smaller concerns of risk or garnering personal credit. DoD entering the picture intent on gaining access to the partner-nation by performing developmental assistance activities changes this delicate balance of trust. The DoD culture and capabilities may be viewed as threatening or inappropriate by the NGOs familiar with the region and appreciative of slow, steady, and stable progress. In addition, the very entry of the DoD into the coordination effort disrupts long-term, established relationships at the collaborative or complementary level of trust between

the DoS/USAID and the NGOs. Thus, the DoD's culture, methodologies, and lack of experience in the region alienate the well established NGOs even before achieving the "communications" level of trust.

On the other hand, some NGOs appreciate the capabilities and resources the DoD brings to a third world environment and tolerates some of the DoD nuances for the good of the needy population.[35] Their relationship with the DoD reflects a cooperative to collaborative-level of trust. Thus, the entry of the DoD into region could polarize established DoS/USAID and NGO relationships while causing another set of NGOs to side with the DoD. Suddenly the focus of the DoS/USAID-hosts becomes conflict mitigation rather than promoting trusting relationships and increasing developmental assistance to the third world beneficiaries. As with the previous alternative, the ongoing Global War on Terrorism strains the personnel resources making it unlikely that the DoD could participate as a member of such a cell across the board.

Alternative Solution #3: A "Hybrid" Solution

To overcome the challenges of a USG-hosted solution, a "hybrid solution" could be adopted. In fact, a model organizational structure already resides within the U.S. government known as the Federal Government Corporation (FGC). For example, the congressionally chartered Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) "provides U.S. assistance for global development…in a manner that promotes economic growth and the elimination of extreme poverty."[36] In general, the formation of a FGC offers many advantages over a bureaucratic entity sponsored by either the DoD or DoS/USAID without over burdening the NGOs. Specifically, Congress charters and funds an FGC when it recognizes a significant need or requirement to correct a major problem

otherwise unsolvable by a conventional USG agency.[37] In this case, the inconsistent flow of federal funding due to the rules established by the federal budget system seriously endangers successful implementation of a USG-hosted coordination venue. To solve this problem, a FGC can be created to mitigate the problems caused by the federal budget cycle. While additional benefits can be derived, this benefit specifically addresses a problem caused by Congress, so it can only be solved by Congress.

In the FGC, Congress can mandate an independent entitlement, like social security, to cover the FGC's annual administrative costs and sponsor NGO participation. This appealing aspect frees the FGC of the need to "use or lose" its annual funding by the end of the fiscal year. In addition, funding continues to flow independent of the annual federal budget system and remains insulated from the risks associated with annual continuing resolution authority (CRA) challenges. As mentioned earlier, a solid funding stream mitigates significant challenges to both the USG-hosted programs and appeals to almost all actors. In addition, an FGC can accept donations from private individuals and other corporations. This fact helps validate the credibility and transparency of the FGC. In fact, a metric could be developed to reflect private support to the corporation as a validation of the success of its programs.

The FGC charter provides additional benefits too. It can be written to address the bureaucratic challenges inherent in a structured government-hosted solution to provide several specific appealing advantages to the NGOs. First, an FGC board of directors made up of government and private sector representatives can be formed to overcome the perception of favoritism or undue influence by one actor over another. Such a board effectively levels the playing field and permits the NGOs to influence proposed activities,

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leveraging their years of experience and regional/functional expertise. The board of directors can either be appointed or elected by the developmental assistance actors who essentially become stakeholders in its success. Specific leadership positions can be designated in the organizational charter for the NGOs to ensure a balance of organizational influence over the long-term.

Internal and external organizational transparency represents the second appealing aspect of the FGC. In effect, the board of directors can mandate external "transparency" by hosting sessions open to the public and publishing minutes releasable to all. When external transparency endangers the security of program participants or the release of sensitive information, internal transparency can be maintained much like a private corporation protects trade secrets. Like a private corporation, all members in good standing can access required developmental assistance information and extremely sensitive information can still be passed through a smaller cell of equally represented and properly accredited planning liaisons. This specific capability mitigates the DoD's concern over operational security and enables progression to higher levels organizational trust.

Effectiveness and efficiency, similar to that of the globalized free-market system, represents a third appeal created by internal and external organizational transparency. The more information an actor contributes the more likely another actor will leverage the information and build upon it to achieve greater synergistic effects for the third world beneficiaries. Non-participants fall behind in performance and achievement while the participating actors increasingly create positive benefits. In effect, philanthropists and governments reward the successful actors with increased donations for proven good

work. Poor actors must choose to participate in the corporation or risk increasing non-relevance. USG actors attempting to circumvent the FGC coordination process would answer to the U.S. Ambassador controlling access through the country clearance system in-place worldwide. Thus, NGOs can be assured of cooperation and compliance by USG actors.

As noted in the two previously suggested processes, concerns also exist for the "hybrid" solution. Successful implementation of the FGC solution requires participatory NGO leadership on the Board of Directors and the planning teams. To encourage NGO participation, Congress must provide the Board of Directors the ability to grant incentives to the participating FGC member organizations. Such incentives must be directed toward the third world beneficiaries, but assist the NGO indirectly by enhancing its capabilities and contributions. This important program aspect avoids the perception that the participating NGOs receive "payment" to join, which would discredit the FGC and its membership in the long run and focuses everything on development. Examples of indirect incentives include subsidizing shipment costs of relief supplies shipped from the U.S. to a foreign port and/or providing in-country logistical support to the NGOs to overcome some of the most costly fees paid by them today. In addition, the DoS/USAID team can encourage participation via their well established habitual relationships with most of the NGOs. Successful FGC management and participative leadership can overcome the preconceived fears of the FGC attempting to change the focus of a specific NGO. A first step towards alleviating the NGOs concerns must be an open invitation to assist with the crafting of the FGC charter. Enabling early

participation in the creation of the FGC will produce the necessary buy-in for actual participation in the chartered corporation.

A second concern resides in the USG personnel assignment system. Based on current rotation policies, DoD, DoS, and USAID personnel will rotate in and out of their FGC planning and coordination cells every 12 to 36 months. Frequent rotations handicap the FGC by inadvertently preventing the development of long-term habitual relationships at the individual and small group level. To mitigate this important factor, DoD and DoS/USAID board members should grow up through the ranks of the FGC and their parent headquarters. This can be accomplished by assigning dedicated personnel to the positions residing within this career track. Although it may be difficult for the NGOs to sustain individual continuity, career DoD and DoS/USAID representation could serve as the bedrock of the FGC's continuity as long as any individual holding a position continues to perform well.

Communications, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Complementary Capability levels of trust all appear achievable in the FGC structured solution. As highlighted above, the communications-level of trust may be the most difficult to achieve due to the untested and voluntary nature of the FGC. Thus, the importance of incorporating active NGO participation and recommendations in the drafting of the corporate charter cannot be overemphasized. The addition of indirect developmental assistance incentives reinforces the importance of NGO participation in the FGC to Congress, the USG agencies, and departments. At the same time it emphasizes the sincerity of the U.S. commitment. Assuming the communications level of trust can be attained, the opportunity to achieve the cooperative, collaborative, and complementary capability

level of trust follows logically from the execution of the charter. The only word of caution concerns the topic of personnel turnover. To prevent regression of levels of trust, the concept of habitual relationships must be reinforced by minimizing personnel turnover. Thus, the topic of personnel turnover must be specifically addressed in the FGC charter to mitigate regression in trust.

Comparative Analysis

Determining the optimal solution must consider its ability to foster long-term, positive relationships, transparency, and the willingness to achieve complementary results between each of the actors to promote the best possible developmental assistance effects. The DoD-hosted communications and coordination quorum parallels the concept of a current Civil-Military Operations Center expanded to the strategic level. Appealing aspects include the ability to provide and transport developmental assistance resources as well as providing Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Teams to the region. Concerning aspects include the ability to consistently provide resources and operational security concerns. Overall, the DoD-hosted quorum can achieve reasonable levels of organizational trust ranging from the lower side of the cooperation level to a solid collaborative level of trust.

In comparison, the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell represents an amplified version of ongoing coordination today. Unlike the DoD, the DoS/USAID team contracts with NGOs and others to perform USG funded activities. Thus, strong habitual relationships exist between the DoS/USAID team and the NGOs. Attempts by the DoD to interject themselves as a third party is problematic and appears unlikely in the short term. Thus, implementation of a DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell may not change

today's coordination methods significantly. In fact, it could cause two polarized groups to form: the DoS/USAID and NGO camp; and the DoD and remaining NGO camp. This could cause the focus of the coordination cell to devolve to mitigating problems rather than creating synergistic opportunities. Thus, solid trust levels may not occur equally among the members.

The hybrid FGC solution addresses the fundamental issue of developmental assistance and overcomes the trust issues posed by either the DoD-hosted quorum or the DoS/USAID-hosted coordination cell. The FGC solution creates a federal government corporation designed to mitigate budget issues and level the playing field via a board of directors. The board of directors can mandate both external and internal transparency to promote trust and protect sensitive security information when prudent. Increased transparency increases effectiveness and efficiencies enabling participants to leverage information and encourage non-participants to join the FGC. Two concerns must be mitigated to ensure FGC success: initial NGO voluntary participation and the USG personnel assignment system. Indirect incentives as a well as inclusion in the FGC charter drafting process can encourage NGO participation. Careful career monitoring and a valid personnel development process can mitigate disruptions to the important habitual relationships formed within the FGC. In summary, the FGC appears to be best structured to encourage fully developed complementary capability levels of trust. It creates the most appealing opportunities for enhancing developmental programs in the third world because it ameliorates the trust issues and focuses effort.

<u>Conclusion</u>

In conclusion, failing social systems and failing governments do not occur in isolation. These problems must be addressed by the U.S. government and others interested in preserving the U.S. inspired world order. To confront the challenge, independent, random developmental assistance activities by the USG and others must be coordinated to create synergistic effects and leverage the capabilities of all through a coordination forum. The coordinating forum must build long-term trusting relationships, foster transparent activities, and achieve complementary results in order to optimize developmental assistance initiatives. Comparative analysis of the three strategic alternatives aimed at improving USG and NGO relationships yields an obvious recommendation: the federal government corporation (FGC). The FGC overcomes the concerns associated with two USG-hosted solutions and creates the greatest opportunities for transparency while leveling the playing field among the three primary actors. With the sharing of power and influence via a board of directors, the NGOs' can contribute robustly to U.S. policy goals and provide a mentoring environment based on years of experience and expertise. Thus, the DoD should pause, take a knee and allow the NGOs to share the lead and mentor the USG on the topic of developmental assistance. Such a solution optimizes developmental assistance progress for the third world in the 21st century.

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